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There is no new world order, not the kind President Bush 
tried to sell us. If the world was new and ordered, Saddam 
Hussein wouldn't have nerve-gassed his people, Slobodan Milosevic 
wouldn't have been elected, and Bill Clinton would have called 
the Rwandan massacres "genocide" sooner. Millions of people 
would be alive instead of slaughtered in the many pockets of 
'disorder' where wars rage to forge identity through hate and 
oppression and violence. School children wouldn't recognize the 
names of shattered nations Bosnia and Rwanda. The world is no 
more ordered or new and moral than it was when Hitler presided 
over the bureaucratic system that designed the deaths of six 
million Jews. Indeed he was much more orderly than most of the 
little wars and small-scale genocides we see today. Perhaps 
instead the world has become more disorderly; the illusion of 
order in a few sterile governments only a half-truth in the face 
of the crumbling of much of the world. The leaders of the U.S., 
of the EU, of NATO, of the U.N., sit in their offices with the 
blinds shut, smoking their cigars, seemingly oblivious to the 
death and destruction and randomness that is tearing apart so 
many nations, lives, and lands and that will not stop until it 
has consumed the newly-paved streets, newly-built skyscrapers, 
and newly-bought Cuban cigars of those who did not wish to see it 
~oming. So the way to deal with this problem is to accept that 
there is one, first of all. To want to know the truth, to want 
















there, and want to stop it, not avoid it. What determines what 
causes problems? Internal or external pressures, or both, or a 
special confluence, forcing the combination to a critical mass? 
The cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda, and Estonia illustrate 
the variety of answers that exist to this question, and by 
examining these countries one discovers different results (some 
tragedies and a few almost positives) of international 
involvement in countries with a history of occupation and 
artificially created ethnic tensions. The perceptions and 
interests of Western countries determine when and how often they 
choose to avoid seeing warning signs of conflict in these areas, 
and the contradictions of prioritizing by political interest 
instead of by human suffering can be easily explored through the 
cases of these three countries. 
Throughout the history of Bosnia, Rwanda, and Estonia, 
foreign powers have played significant roles in determining the 
course of their history, and in each managed to exacerbate or 
sometimes even create ethnic and religious tensions. Bosnia-
Herzegovina, which seceded from Yugoslavia in 1992, had not been 
an independent state before. 1 Throughout Bosnia's history one 
needs to keep the region in the context of what was happening in 
the other areas of what would become Yugoslavia, because the 
ethnic/religious/historical differences within Bosnia are 
sometimes related and sometimes stem from those of Serbia and 
Croatia and elsewhere. Ironically, in true ethnic terms, the 




















all Yugoslavs (South Slavs).2 
Since the sixteenth century, Bosnia has been the meeting 
place of many fault lines running across Europe, torn between 
great powers, ideologies, and religions. It has always been a 
prize sought after, never a people with interests of its own to 
be considered. The Habsburg empire of Austria and Hungary 
conquered most of what is now Slovenia and Croatia in the 1100s, 
and by the sixteenth century they also ruled over parts of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. 3 The Ottoman Turks at the same time had 
control of Serbia, Macedonia, and most of Montenegro and Bosnia-
Herzegovina.' The struggle between these two polyglot empires 
and their different methods of rule was one of the first battles 
over Bosnia's lands and people. Great powers bickering over 
which would have influence in Bosnia has been a recurring theme 
in its history; this theme is found in th~ histories of Rwanda 
and Estonia as well. s 
3 
The Turks began to convert the nobility of their new 
territories, and concentrated on Bosnia and Herzegovina because 
it bordered Christian territories. To encourage Bosnians to 
convert to Islam, "the Turks applied pressure, along with 
economic and political advantages." 6 There were Serbs, Croats, 
and others in Bosnia at the time. Serbs had a strong Eastern 
Orthodox tradition, and Croats a commitment to Roman Catholicism, 
but many peasants of both faiths converted to gain favor under 
the new rulers.? The Bosnia-Herzegovinians also included 

















known; it is thought to have derived from the influence of a 
twelfth century sect of heretical Christians called Bogomils. 
4 
The Bogomils consistently worked to prevent domination of their 
people by either the Western Catholic or the Eastern Orthodox 
traditions; consequently, they proved the most receptive to 
conversion to Islam. Thus a completely new population group 
appeared in Yugoslavia: Slavic Muslims. Under the Ottoman 
system, the only way to be a free peasant family in Bosnia-
Herzegovina was to become Muslim. Hence, the previous members of 
the landed aristocracy (Serb, Croat, and other non-Muslims) in 
the areas of occupation lost their status. A feudal system 
continued in Bosnia up until World War 1. 8 Peasants, about 
seventy-five percent of whom were Serb, twenty percent Croat, and 
the rest Muslim, worked for Muslim landowners as kmets (similar 
to sharecroppers). These conditions fueled resentment and anti-
Islamic tendencies throughout the twentieth century.9 Bosniars 
changes in social groupings and structure are examples of an 
artificially created religious and ethnic situation; the Turks 
were a ruling foreign power that altered the composition of its 
subject peoples. Because of this, the 400 years (16th century to 
20th) of Ottoman rule in Bosnia has had tremendous consequences. 
Most of Bosnia remained under Ottoman control while Serbia 
grew restless. Serbs began a period of revolt against the Turks 
in 1804 that, along with another major battle in 1815, heralded 
the weakening of Ottoman power in Europe. According to Dragnich, 


















Serbia gained de facto independence;" however, it was 1878 before 
the state was formally recognized by the international 
community. 10 Bosnia was not able to achieve similar status. 
Bosnia-Herzegovina was placed under Austrian control at the 
Congress of Berlin in 1878, and annexed by Austria in 1908. 11 It 
remained, along with Croatia and Slovenia, a part of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire until the Empire's demise at the end of World 
War 1.12 Croatia and Slovenia had been subject to Western 
influences and adopted the Latin alphabet and Roman Catholicism, 
while Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia were subject to Eastern 
influences and adopted the Cyrillic alphabet and the Eastern 
Orthodox church. 13 By the mid-nineteenth century, then, Serbs, 
Croats, and Bosnians were already divided by history, culture, 
religion, and loyalties imposed upon them by outside forces. 
Bosnia was the meeting point of all these opposing ideas, with 
some Bosnians identifying with Croatia, and some with Serbia, and 
others with the religion of Islam and neither Croatia nor 
Serbia. 14 
While these differences fermented quietly, a conflict 
between Austria and Serbia was brewing that would send the world 
floundering toward war, and the line between the Allies and the 
Central powers would run through the middle of Bosnia. Austria-
Hungary felt threatened by a strong, independent Serbia because 
Austria's Slavic subjects might begin to hope for their own 
independence, or simply want to leave the Empire and join the new 
















for Slavic unity, which, along with its companion movement of 
nationalistic pride, had gained fuel from a short Napoleonic 
occupation in the early 1800s. 16 As a result, Austria tried to 
find ways to keep Serbia weak, such as annexing Bosnia. The 
annexation was a blow to Serbia because the Serbs also wanted 
influence in Bosnia because it was a Slavic region which could 
perhaps unite with the Serb state. It was in Serbia's interests 
for Bosnia to remain mostly free at the least; Austria's moves to 
overtly control the region would only put the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire that much closer to Serbia's doorstep. Thus Bosnia-
Herzegovina was a pawn in Austria's play for influence and 
Serbia's bid for survival in a hostile Europe. l7 Once again 
Bosnia was the object of a strategic struggle between two powers 
(as when Austria-Hungary was battling the Ottoman empire) in 
which the desires of the Bosnian people were never considered. 
The current power struggle has been a similar situation--Serbia 
was fighting Slovenia and Croatia, and Bosnia was in the middle, 
and few gave any thought to what the Bosnians wanted or what the 
consequences for them might be. 
World Wars I and II can be seen as continuations of this 
theme of external influences interfering in the development of 
Bosnians, and all Yugoslavs. In 1914, it was with Serbian 
interests in mind that Gavrilo Princip, a Bosnian Serb Pan-
Slavist, assassinated the heir to the Habsburg throne, Ar~hduke 
Francis Ferdinand. ls This assassination led to World War I, as 



















and Serbia could not acquiesce and retain its sovereignty. In 
the ensuing conflict, Croats, Slovenes, Bosnian Muslims, and some 
Serbs from the Military Frontier regions (areas on the Habsburg-
Ottoman border) of Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Hungary 
fought on the side of Austria and the Central Powers, and the 
Serbs from Serbia and Montenegro fought with the Allies.19 This 
war that so many Slavs participated in was another external 
factor that caused division among the Yugoslavs. They had lived 
together mostly peacefully for centuries before this, only to be 
forced into conflict because of a slowly crumbling Empire's bid 
to crush its rising Slavic rivals. Almost any small conflict 
could have sparked World War I during such an age of competing 
militarism in Europe, but the struggle over Bosnia provided the 
spark. World War I could be seen as a warning that arbitrary 
decisions about another country's destiny can have horrific 
consequences. 
After World War I, Bosnia was incorporated into the Kingdom 
of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, later to be renamed "Yugoslavia." 
The unity implied by statehood didn't last long, as World War II 
brought external pressures too great for the new state to handle. 
A war within a war raged in Yugoslavia, and Bosnia was the site 
of most of the atrocities committed in the clash of external and 
internal forces. Hitler set up a Fascist puppet state in Croatia 
whose troops (German and Croat, and some others) killed about 
200,000 Serb civilians, and tens of thousands of Muslims, Jews, 














scattered in the initial Axis invasion and split into factions of 
royalists and Communists (to simplify the distinctions), fighting 
each other and the German and Croatian troops.21 
At the end of the war, Marshall Josip Broz Tito, leader of 
the Communist Partisan fighters, came to power with help from 
Russian troops. Tito was responsible for setting up the modern 
Yugoslavia: the six republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia, and two 
autonomous provinces in the area of Serbia, Vojvodina and Kosovo . 
This arrangement lasted until the wars of this decade. 22 The 
most pressing issue facing Tito was how to quell the violence 
that had been unleashed across the country, and avoid a backlash 
of Serb reprisals against the Croats. To that end, he severely 
punished nationalists and separatists, and basically froze 
religious, historical, and cultural divisions in a system of 
Communist authoritarianism. In the government of the state, Tito 
tried to maintain a balance of power between the republics by 
diffusing what he saw as Serbian hegemony. To that end, he 
placed Serbian Communists in offices outside of Belgrade, so 
there was a disproportionate number of Serbs in power in other 
republics, and of non-Serbs in power in Serbia. 23 Although the 
Communist solutions kept nationalistic passions and hatreds in 
check, they failed to establish an alternative, supranational, 
Yugoslav movement which the people actually believed in. Because 
of Communist rule and Tito's use of repression, in Yugoslavia 

















[and] the nations of Yugoslavia failed to free themselves from 
pseudoromantic images of themselves and negative stereotypes of 
each other. ,,24 
9 
Thus Yugoslavia entered the 1980's after Tito's death facing 
the crippling realities of unresolved fears and unanswered 
stereotypes. Tito had given Yugoslavia some short term gains. 
Slovenia and Croatia had benefitted under Tito's programs of 
economic development, but the eastern republics (Bosnia, Serbia, 
Montenegro, and Macedonia) had been largely left out. People 
lived together in peace for nearly fifty years; in the urban 
areas especially, nationalities were fairly well integrated, 
tolerant of each other, and frequently intermarried. However, in 
rural, isolated areas, the lack of opportunity to address what 
had happened during the war would come back to haunt Yugoslavia 
in the long run. 25 If its rural population had a picture of 
itself and other nationalities that was limited to grandparents' 
stories of heroism and atrocities, how could such a state be 
expected to sail smoothly into modern, cohesive, and democratic 
statehood? It simply couldn't, and with the fall of Communism 
and the rise of Franjo Tudjman and Slobodan Milosevic, presidents 
of Croatia and Serbia respectively, nationalism was slowly thawed 
out of its Titoist deep freeze. Tudjman and Milosevic both had 
designs on Bosnia, as each considered the Bosnians really just 
mislabeled Serbs or Croats. 
Tudjman and especially Milosevic continued to try and carve 















signs of which were ignored by the international community. 
Other nations, like Rwanda and Estonia, have similarly complex 
histories of external influence and interference in the 
development of social and ethnic divisions in their societies . 
For Rwanda, it was the imperialism of the Germans, and then the 
Belgians, which began a cycle of interference and machinations 
that would not only become policies of divide and rule, but 
eventually divide and destroy. 
10 
Germans who came to explore the region that would become 
Rwanda, the indigenous peoples consisted of three groups: the 
Twa, a pygmy people who only made up about one percent of the 
population; the Hutu, who were mainly peasant cultivators, and 
the Tutsi, who generally were cattle owners. The social system 
in place used the village, usually based around a hill, as the 
basic political unit of the country. There were usually two 
local chiefs, one each for the farmers and the herders, and there 
were army chiefs over larger areas who tended to be Tutsi. 26 The 
distinction at this point between Hutu and Tutsi was not clearly 
defined in ethnic or racial terms. The groups were generally 
distinguished through a sort of social caste system, in which the 
Tutsis (about 14 percent of the population) had a higher status 
associated with wealth and cattle ownership, and the Hutus (about 
85 percent of the people) had a lower status because of their 
roles as farmers; the Twa occupied the very lowest position, and 
their role in Rwandan society, alone among the other groups, has 

















potential for social ladder-climbing, as a Hutu who gained wealth 
or prestige, or perhaps married into a Tutsi family, could 
achieve Tutsi status. Likewise, if a Tutsi lost wealth, he or 
she could be lose status and "become" a HutU. 21 
This way of life, although Hutus were generally subordinate 
to Tutsis and lived under a Tutsi monarchy, did grant the Hutu 
some say in their governance, and in some areas of Rwanda there 
was a power structure of Hutu princes. Thus, by the late 19th 
century, Rwanda was not a model of equality, but most people did 
have some political rights and the potential for moving up in 
society, and one might have eventually seen a systemic evolution 
toward greater democracy. 28 
However, the late nineteenth century was also the time of 
the great "scramble for Africa" by colony-hungry European powers . 
The Germans acquired Rwanda in 1896. Here the Rwandans ceased to 
be in control of their own destiny, victims of a stripping away 
of their right to self-determination that would have deadly 
consequences for future generations. 29 The Germans only had 
control of the area from 1896 to 1916; Belgium took over the 
colony during World War I, continuing and expanding German 
systems of control. The Belgians slowly phased in a system of 
bureaucratic governance in which only Tutsis were allowed to hold 
positions. Both the Germans and the Belgians had immediately 
favored the Tutsis, in part because of appearance (although not 
uniform by any means, there are racial stereotypes of what 
















Tutsis were thought to be taller and lighter-skinned, and partly 
because they already seemed to run things. The Europeans 
developed elaborate racial theories to connect their favored 
group to Aryan descent in order to justify establishing it as 
dominant (and probably to make themselves feel better about 
associating with Africans). One of these myths was called the 
It 'Hamitic hypothesis'" and it maintained "that all pre-colonial 
civilization in Africa was brought by outsiders, specifically the 
Hamitic branch of the Caucasian race." Scholar Alex de Waal 
asserts that this theory "is no longer academically 
respectable. ,,30 Such a baseless and biased perception, the norm 
for European thinking about Africa, was the kind of foundation 
upon which the Belgians built their regime in Rwanda and it 
illustrates the dangers of outside control by ignorant leaders, 
as well as the power of perception in general to distort the 
reality of a situation. 
Although they constructed these justifications to let 
themselves believe they were rightly supporting some kind of 
inherently socially and politically superior race, the Europeans 
were in reality just taking away the political and civil rights 
of Hutus. Only those who went through the new European education 
system could hold government office; only Tutsi men were allowed 
access to this education. 31 Therefore the Hutus and all women 
were phased out of political life in Rwanda. The whole of north-
west Rwanda, which had been independently ruled by Hutu princes, 















The continuing conquest showed a total disregard for the 
indigenous forms of government already set up, and dramatically 
altered the social customs and governing traditions of the area. 
The Belgians decided in 1933-34 that the distinction between Hutu 
and Tutsi, which they had already altered by colonial 
machinations, should be made even more strict and arbitrary. 
Belgian officials assigned every Rwandan an identity card which 
defined them as Tutsi, Hutu, or Twa for the rest of their lives. 
According to prominent Rwandan human rights activist Monique 
Mujawamariya, when the Belgians wanted to do a census of the 
population, they found they couldn't tell Hutu and Tutsi citizens 
apart, and so instituted an arbitrary and problematic rule. For 
the sake of simplicity they decreed that if one had five cows one 
would be considered a Tutsi. Mujawamariya said this created many 
problems because some people tried to buy or borrow cattle in 
order to be counted as members of the favored group.33 
This was a blatant form of interference--the Belgians 
invented rigid definitions of Hutu and Tutsi that simply hadn't 
existed before. Since Belgian officials preferred to govern 
through Tutsis, and only Tutsis were to have access to 
educational services and other privileges, they must have wanted 
a way of identifying who was Tutsi and who was not. Therefore 
they imposed an unchangeable label on every Rwandan in a society 
which had originally allowed for social mobility. The Belgians 
assigned Rwandans an ethnicity much as one assigns young children 

















customs. The officials tried to mold the African society into a 
shape that met their needs. 
This policy of assigning ethnicity and elevating the Tutsis 
to a higher status was a policy of divide and rule. Some Tutsis 
were happy to cooperate to get the benefits of collaboration, but 
as in any such situation, those out of power became extremely 
resentful. Some Tutsis also began to feel superior to Hutus, 
just as they had been told they were, and in any event, most 
wanted to keep their powerful status; the way to do that was to 
keep Hutus subservient. 34 
Although the histories of Bosnia and Rwanda are of course 
quite different, one can already see parallels. In Bosnia the 
Turks "created" a population of Muslims and granted them social 
privileges. Sometimes conversions were voluntary, and sometimes 
they were forced, but it was only converts who could own land, 
and have any chance of escaping the harsh life of a peasant. 
Foreign powers would continue, for the most part, to dictate the 
destiny of the country. In Rwanda as in Bosnia, a foreign regime 
"created" distinct populations where there had been none. Hutu 
and Tutsi had been rather fluid groups. Belgium granted one 
group privileges and higher status, and Belgian interference and 
later that of other powers would continue in Rwanda's history. 
The foreign rulers were different in the two countries, and no 
one handed out identity cards in Bosnia, but the influence of 
foreign control and the ignoring of the needs and wants of the 



















would later have tragic impacts in both countries. 
In the 1950s when Catholic missionaries from Belgium began 
to help educate and raise the social consciences of Hutus, Tutsis 
began to clamor for independence and demanded an end to this new 
European interference in their affairs which now threatened their 
hold on power. 35 This of course did not sit well with the 
Belgians. However, in the midst of this, violence broke out in 
1959 among Tutsis and Hutus. Tutsi leaders moved to put down 
what they saw as a rebellion, and Belgium responded by stopping 
Tutsi retaliation, shifting its policies from that point to favor 
Hutu enfranchisement and inclusion in politics. The Catholic 
missionaries had been successful in pleading the case of the 
oppressed Hutus to the Belgian government. But the toll of the 
violence that occurred between 1959 and 1962 was large, and "a 
horrendous precedent had been set" that would haunt Rwanda up to 
the present. 36 In those three years, Hutu had expelled "in the 
cruelest fashion, perhaps 100,000 Tutsi," and both sides 
destroyed homes and killed hundreds. 37 The refugees play an 
important role in the recent history of Rwanda . 
The Hutu held elections in 1960, and as they comprised 85% 
of the population, Hutu candidates under party leader Gregoire 
Kayabanda won overwhelmingly. Over the next few years there was 
much external involvement in Rwandan affairs, this time at the 
request of Rwandans themselves. The United Nations monitored and 
postponed some election processes at the request of Tutsis. The 


















the Hutus. By placing their support behind Hutus now, Belgium 
was holding on to its influence in the country; the imperialists 
were still practicing divide and rule. Hutu leaders then felt 
that the rest of the world was pro-Tutsi; this may help account 
for their strict guarding of power over the next 30 years. There 
were instances of sporadic violence as Hutu chiefs' repressions 
would force more Tutsis into leaving home, and some refugees 
would commit terrorist acts against Hutu officials, perpetuating 
a cycle of repression, expulsion, and violence. 38 
In 1962, the U.N. agreed to support Rwandan independence 
largely because of assurances like an agreement to guarantee 
Tutsis two ministerial posts. However, Kayabanda appointed Hutus 
to fill the Tutsi positions 18 months after the Belgians left.39 
Thus Rwanda went from one-party colonial rule to one-party 
indigenous rule. The identity cards the Belgians had issued were 
kept current (and were used as long as the Hutu held power, in 
the 1990s often marking one for life or death), and many other 
aspects of the colonial bureaucracy were retained. 40 The Hutu 
government became overtly anti-Tutsi, simply reversing roles in 
society instead of building a nation-state of parity and justice . 
Philip Gourevitch writes in the New Yorker that "Rwanda's 
revolutionaries had become what V.S. Naipaul calls postcolonial 
'mimic men,' who reproduce the abuses against which they 
rebelled, while ignoring the fact that their past-masters were 
ultimately banished by those they enchained."u 













the dictates of the U.N., was extensive. However, it was also 
complicated, for at times Rwandans actually wanted foreign 
involvement. In part the perceptions of the international 
community about who was being oppressed by whom determined some 
reactions. For the Belgians it seems to have been more who could 
give them the support they needed to stay in power. The Hutus 
gained in power, they were an 85 percent majority, and the 
Belgians backed them up. In the end it is most often interests 
that motivate international political actors. The Belgians ended 
up abandoning the Tutsis to support the Hutus, but the U.N. then 
rushed in to protect Tutsi rights, in part because it wanted to 
protect stability in the region. It became a situation each 
group (Hutus and Tutsis) felt it had to dominate the other to 
ensure its own security. This feeling illustrates the difficulty 
of restoring a balance once the pendulum has been swung one way 
or the other, especially in such an artificially created 
situation. After Belgium set up Tutsis as the superior class, 
the Hutus would naturally want to retake power, especially as 
they make up the majority of the population. They might have a 
tendency to want to rule too harshly, however, because that is 
what they suffered under the Tutsis. Once power is just given, 
it is clung to, and when one group succeeds in wresting it away 
from the unjust, it will be more likely to be unjust in reaction, 
not just out of revenge, but out of fear. No one wants to be 
subjugated twice. 













exclude them from the political system. The consequences of 
power politics would be genocide. Rwanda's complex history 
provides some explanation, but the final steps toward mass murder 
would be those taken by contemporary leaders, in Rwanda and in 
the international community . 
In Estonia, one can find early historical parallels with 
both Bosnia and Rwanda. The Estonian people had a variety of 
foreign rulers over the years; though most all were quite harsh 
masters, the variety may be one reason the Estonians have managed 
to keep their problems with minority groups non-violent. 
Historian Rein Taagepera has said Estonia benefitted at times 
from larger powers' competition over its population and 
territory.42 This occasional positive effect is not found in 
most of Rwandan and Bosnian history, in which both countries 
generally suffered more from the power struggles waged over their 
lands. 
From the 13th century until after World War I, Estonia was 
ruled by outsiders. The lands that would become Estonia were 
first conquered by the Germans, who came to the Baltic region 
after failures in the Crusades. German rule introduced feudalism 
to a land that had been structured around federations of small 
village groups. The hierarchical feudal structure was quite new 
to the Estonians, who were forced to become serfs to German 
landholders. The Estonians faced numerous invasions and raids 
throughout their history, though German rule was a constant for 












1561. 43 The southern part of Estonia was then part of a 
Lithuanian-Polish duchy.44 Little changed for the Estonian 
peasants, although the famine, plague and war before and after 
the Swedish rule fixed that era in memory as lithe good old ... 
times." Russian forces then established themselves in Estonia 
over the period of years 1704-1710 during the Great Northern War 
(1700-1721). Russian rule lasted until the Bolshevik revolution 
in 1917. The Baltic Germans had remained landowners after the 
end of German rule but had carried little influence. After 
giving some aid in the Russian takeover, and because they were 
generally more educated than the average Russian at that time, 
the Baltic Germans were able to reach a high level of political 
and social influence under Russian governance. 45 
The Estonians were able to take some refuge from their 
conquerors through their language. A Finno-Ugric language, 
Estonian is in the same family as Finnish and Hungarian, but all 
are very different than the Indo-European languages of most of 
the rest of Europe. The language barrier made the lines between 
the peasants and everyone else--the Baltic Germans, the rulers of 
the moment, Christian missionaries--much clearer. 46 
Russian rule was hard on the Estonians but it provided some 
benefits. The Estonians had been ruled by Germans and subject to 
influence from German culture for so long that the new influence 
of Russian culture was almost a balance. The Swedish competition 
with Poland-Lithuania over religious converts in the sixteenth 













Catholic and Lutheran priests tried to learn the language. 
Estonians were thus spared an overwhelming imperial influence . 
This helped preserve the Estonian identity and language in spite 
of the small size of the population." 
Serfdom was abolished in 1816 in the Baltic provinces, but 
not in Russia. This 'freedom' ended up more dangerous for the 
peasants than feudalism, however. Peasants were no longer 
property, and therefore the land owners would not lose anything 
if they worked a peasant to death.48 
By the mid nineteenth century there were peasant revolts 
because of harsh conditions. By 1905, the Russian revolution 
altered conditions. Martial law was declared after the Estonians 
called for autonomy within the Russian empire. By 1906 some 
actual progress was being made, and officials set up some 
Estonian language schools. However, World War I interrupted 
whatever further reforms might have been possible. 49 
The Estonians generally viewed the war as a Russian-German 
conflict, and they definitely favored the Russians after their 
long servitude to the Baltic barons of the German upper class. 
Thus 100,000 men joined up, about 20 percent of the population at 
the time. World War I was an external struggle in which the 
Estonians were able to playa real part. They felt they were 
fighting against years of German domination, and that they would 
be able to earn autonomy from the Russians in the end. 50 In some 
ways this was an external conflict which would become a fight 















place with its own people whose desires were disregarded. 
By February 1918, with Russia floundering and the Germans 
invading, Estonia declared independence. February 24 is still 
celebrated as Independence Day. The Germans occupied Estonia 
until their surrender to the allies in November 1918. The 
Bolshevik forces almost immediately tried to move back onto 
Estonian territory. A new war ensued between Estonian and these 
Russian forces. With a little luck, a little money from Finland, 
and a little naval maneuvering by Britain, the Estonians drove 
the Bolsheviks out. A peace treaty was signed in Tartu on 2 
February, 1920, recognizing Estonian independence and fixing its 
borders. In 1919, there were also brief pitched battles with 
German mercenary forces. The German army was still trying to 
keep some control over the Baltics, and had mercenaries on the 
side of the "Whites" in Latvia, where initially Latvian "Red" 
forces backed the Bolsheviks. In the end, Estonian troops helped 
win the long final battle at Cesis on June 23, 1919 for a 
democratic Latvian government. This is celebrated as victory 
day, even though an armistice with the Russians wasn't signed 
until 31 December, 1919--indicative of the huge symbolic 
significance that the June victory had as revenge against their 
old oppressors. 51 
An important consequence of Estonian victory was the chance 
to set its own borders. Estonia had a distinct advantage over 
both Bosnia (within Yugoslavia) and Rwanda because it was a 














had fairly clear borders on three sides (a sea on two, a lake on 
one other). There were Estonians in other areas of course, but 
few concentrated or concerned enough with rejoining Estonia to 
cause problems. An area beyond the Narva river that was mostly 
Russian was given back to Estonia because it had historically 
been part of Estonia. However, there was an area of Estonians in 
one nearby Russian province that was not ceded to the new 
country. Coincidentally the numbers mostly balanced out. 52 
Perhaps Estonia was thus less an artificial creation than 
Yugoslavia or Rwanda, because the Estonian people were basically 
homogenous, for the most part all were Estonians culturally and 
linguistically.53 Yugoslavia was created from a movement for 
Slavic unity, but it was a lofty, intellectual movement at best. 
Thus Yugoslavia was more "created" by the Versailles treaty than 
one can say of Estonia. Rwanda was invented by the European 
imperialists and mapmakers, and did not conform to much of any 
traditional border or social or ethnic distinction. Europeans 
delineated African borders according to where they had sent 
explorers, and what could be agreed upon in conferences in 
European capitals like Berlin. 
Thus Estonia was in better shape than most new states in the 
interwar years: clear boundaries, stable government (democratic 
with authoritarian interlude 1934-1938), mostly homogenous 
population, and good trade. International recognition came first 
from the Soviets with the Tartu treaty. European recognition 

















League of Nations in 1921 as well. The u.s. did not recognize 
Estonia until 1922. 54 
It is important to note the situation of minorities in 
Estonia. The new nation was 8 percent Russian, 1.5 percent 
23 
German, .5 percent Jewish, and .5 percent Swedish. The Estonian 
government set up programs of cultural autonomy, both for 
concentrated groupings of minorities and for those more spread 
out. This "non-territorial cultural autonomy" system allowed the 
Russian and Swedish populations to have schools run in Russian or 
Swedish and to have local self-government. It worked out very 
well. Minority groups were not completely integrated into the 
society, but it was a good start, and much better than some 
countries. 55 
However, the onset of World War II interrupted the natural 
course of national development. Estonia and the other Baltic 
nations tried to remain neutral, but their geopolitical situation 
did not permit such a straightforward course. The Molotov-
Ribbentrop nonaggression pact signed in August 1939 by Germany 
and the Soviet Union included secret protocols that divided 
Eastern Europe between them in the event of war. The USSR was to 
get part of Poland and all of Estonia, among other things. The 
protocol read: 
IIIIn the event of a territorial and political rearrangement in 
the areas belonging to the Baltic states (Finland, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania), the northern boundary of Lithuania shall 
represent the boundary of the spheres of influence of Germany 
and the USSR. t 1156 


















Europeans countries is an ultimate example of blatant foreign 
interference. The aims were purely territorial and strategic, 
with no concern for the peoples involved. 
24 
Consequently, World War II cast a shadow across Estonia's 
future. First, in 1939 after the German invasion of Poland, part 
of Poland and then most of Lithuania was given to the U.S.S.R. by 
Germany. Then Soviet army forces marched to the Estonian border 
and demanded army bases. Estonia was outnumbered ten to one and 
hadn't mobilized. Therefore leaders chose to accept a "pact of 
defense and mutual assistance with the USSR." on 28 September 
1939. 57 This symbolized the end of Estonian independence for the 
next 50 years. 
Estonia faced a rapid yet subtle takeover in 1940, as the 
Soviets tried to paint their actions as justified because the 
Estonians had supposedly gone back on an important treaty.58 The 
Soviets deported Estonia's former head of state. This incident 
was a great insult because Estonia was still technically 
independent. Estonia was formally annexed in August 1940. 59 
Mass deportations began in 1941--over 6,000 at once in one area. 
Men took to the forests in a guerrilla campaign to resist the 
Soviets and to escape a similar fate. Then the Germans returned, 
taking Tallinn on 28 August 1941. They were welcomed by some 
Estonians because of the harshness of Soviet rule, but not for 
long. 5,000 Estonians were murdered or sent to camps. Perhaps 
15,000 were sent off to forced labor in Germany; some chose 


















do so. Estonian political leaders organized a provisional 
government as the German war machine began to break down in order 
to be prepared for liberation. 60 
Unfortunately, the Soviets were not moved by this display of 
nationhood when they returned as the Germans retreated. They 
quickly re-established control, and Estonia was again a Soviet 
Socialist Republic. A wave of Soviet immigration ensued because 
of Soviet encouragement in some cases, but also because of better 
living conditions and job opportunities (since the Soviets gave 
out administrative jobs to Russians in Estonia). The Estonians 
naturally resented these immigrants, whom many characterize as 
colonists, because they were essentially moving in and claiming 
alien territory as their own. 61 
The Estonians lived in terror of the purges and deportations 
that were all too consistent between 1945-1953; they feared 
losing their lives, their houses, their jobs, their farms, their 
loved ones. Stalin made a point of making his violence 
widespread enough to inspire fear everywhere. An alien imperial 
power had come in and set up a colonial state in Estonia. 62 
In March 1949 Stalin had about 20,000 Estonian farmers 
deported because they weren't collectivizing fast enough. There 
were widespread injustices in housing allocation, etc. in favor 
of Russian "colonists." In 1945, 94 percent of Estonia was 
native Estonian. In 1953, 72 percent was Estonian, and that 
number included an extra group: Estonians who had gone to Russia 














better condi tions-- "Russian Estonians. ,,63 The new minority of 
Russians, artificially injected into Estonia, set up the 
potential for conflict in the 1980s and 1990s when Estonia began 
to press for autonomy and then independence from the Soviet 
Union. 
Many countries, then, have been colonized or ruled by some 
external power. Why is it that only some explode in horrific 
violence as Yugoslavia and Rwanda did? The deciding element is a 
mixture of internal factors and external factors. In examining 
these countries, common themes emerge, and differences become 
clear as well. Each had to struggle throughout its history 
against the designs of outside forces, and each has been the 
victim of significant interference in its ethnic, social, and/or 
religious composition and traditions. Other nations, sometimes 
the international community in the form of the U.N., have often 
acted on misperceptions in each country as well, and have 
sometimes defined their priorities according to political 
expediency rather than in the interest of the people in question. 
More examples of this can be found in the more recent history of 
these three areas. 
Starting with Bosnia, one can follow the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia and see many instances of misunderstandings, 
interference, and attempts at aid by other nations. In 1987, 
Slobodan Milosevic took power in the Serbian Communist Party. 
His rise is important because the revival of nationalisms and 












He was a fiery politician who won popularity by criticizing the 
Serbian Communist Party leadership's policy on KoSOVO. 64 Kosovo 
was the site of the Serbs' defeat at the hands of the Ottoman 
Turks on June 28, 1389 (the beginning of the 450 year Ottoman 
occupation of Serbia), and the day remains sacred to Serbs. 65 
27 
Tito's Yugoslavia only worked by consensus, and if leaders 
didn't use nationalism or populist activism to appeal to the 
people. By raising the flag of nationalism, Milosevic broke the 
first of Tito's taboos. He wanted to gain power in the party, 
and his method worked well. The Serbs began to follow him, be-
lieving his stories of the oppression of Kosovo's Serbian minor-
ity. The Kosovo province is about 90 percent ethnic Albanian, 
the rest Serbian. His success was fueled by his next step, the 
breaking of Tito's second taboo, when he began to mobilize the 
Serbian masses. To do this, he orchestrated a network of 
demonstrations in various towns in around Serbia. This network 
was "part of a well-organized plan, designed to intimidate the 
non-Serb peoples of Yugoslavia, instill among Serbs the idea that 
their fellow Serbs were being ... discriminated against," and to 
stress the position of Milosevic as "the undisputed master of 
post-Ti to Yugoslavia. ,,66 On the 600th anniversary of the Battle 
of Kosovo, Milosevic spoke at a rally on the site of the ancient 
battle, "the Field of Blackbirds" in Kosovo; he had over one 
million Serbs gathered in the middle of a largely Albanian prov-
ince. His message to the other republics was hardly one of 
















This kind of demonstration of power was immediately 
recognized as a potential threat by the other republics of 
Yugoslavia, although the international community was either 
unaware or hoping to ignore its significance. Thus Yugoslav 
politics descended into nationalism and propaganda-fueled 
accusations. 
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The Slovenes were the first to raise a protest to 
Milosevic's policies, foreshadowing the rivalries of the next few 
years. 68 Franjo Tudjman was elected president of Croatia in 
April of 1990, and after that, Milosevic made the small leap from 
championing the cause of the Serb minority in Kosovo to that of 
the Serb minority in Croatia. 69 From this point things could 
only get worse. In response to the position of Milosevic, the 
other Yugoslav republics began to adopt more nationalistic 
agendas as well. The Muslim President of Bosnia, Alija 
Izetbegovic, faced a particularly difficult situation, because 
his republic was in-between Serbia and Croatia, homes of the most 
intense feelings--in addition Bosnia had many Serbs and Croats 
inside its borders. He tried to stay out of the arguing between 
Serbia and Croatia, believing that modernity and the cosmopolitan 
nature of Bosnia and especially Sarajevo would triumph in the 
end, but that would not prove to be enough. The other republics 
believed their only alternative to verbally attacking Serbia was 
to accept Serbian dominance over areas that were not legally 
Serbian and they refused to let that happen. 'o 















Vojvodina. He had staged demonstrations in each, supposedly of 
people clamoring for new governments. In reality these were 
controlled by Milosevic himself, and he put his allies in power 
in each province. 71 The conflict in Kosovo today dates from this 
institution of Serbian control. In April of 1998 Milosevic sent 
in armed policemen into Kosovo to crack down on alleged 
supporters of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), an anti-Serbian, 
pro-independence terrorist group. About 80 ethnic Albanians were 
killed in the initial clashes, and since then sporadic violence 
has continued. The situation is much like the beginning of the 
war in Bosnia in 1992. 
What does Milosevic have to do with Bosnia? Everything, 
because the pressure that Milosevic put on Kosovo over the Serb 
minority he then put on Croatia because of its Serb minority, and 
eventually he backed the minority of the Bosnian Serbs as well. 
He began Yugoslavia's breakup, the animosity, the fear. 
Milosevic wanted to make Yugoslavia a centralized state (a 
greater Serbia) instead of a federation, and after talks the 
other republics became so frustrated that they considered 
secession. This is what Slovenia and Croatia did in 1991. 
Various moves had been made by the u.S. and others in 1990 to 
show support for the governmental negotiations, and to advocate 
unity for the Yugoslav state.72 
Secretary of State James Baker Ill's last minute trip to 
Belgrade on the eve of Slovenia and Croatia's secession was to 




















conflict in Balkans could be the source of World War 111.'3 This 
is an indication that the U.S. government did appreciate the 
serious consequences of a conflict in the Balkans. If that is 
true, however, one would have thought that Baker would not have 
made the trip; many have said Milosevic took Baker's plea for 
unity as a license to use force.'· Judging from Milosevic's 
track record, however, he didn't need a great deal of 
justification; he doesn't usually attempt to court much 
international approval unless he is hurting at home. So this 
action by the U.S. probably did not push Milosevic to his 
decision to send tanks and soldiers into Slovenia and Croatia to 
keep them from leaving Yugoslavia . 
However, the international community may be more responsible 
for the eventual atrocities in Bosnia. The West pursued 
confusing policies toward Yugoslavia. Initially, the U.S. and 
most of the European Union wanted to move slowly in recognizing 
Slovenia and Croatia's independence. Germany pushed hard for 
quick recognition to be given by the end of 1991, even though it 
was uncertain whether or not Croatia had met important human 
rights requirements assigned to it. Germany went ahead and 
announced in December it would recognize the two new states 
unconditionally in January of 1992. The EU had little leverage 
to get compliance from Croatia after that, and so it followed 
suit shortly after. The U.S. did as well, but somewhat later.'s 
Bosnia was put in a terrible position because of all of this . 



















concerns. These included a Croat population of 500,000 in 
Germany which was a powerful lobby, and a desire to promote the 
ideal of self-determination after successfully using it 
themselves to unify East and West Germany.76 
31 
This is another example of disregard of the needs of the 
Bosnian people--because international obligations are usually 
dropped in favor of domestic concerns when there is no security 
issue at stake. It is also a question of perception and 
priority, because Germany believed that the Slovenes, Croats, and 
even Bosnians would be able to "self-determine" their status 
fairly and peacefully. The German leaders also believed that 
this was best; secession was good for the breakaway republics. 
German priority was on domestic reasonings and on the value of 
choice. 77 The dangers to Bosnia, because of the complexity of 
the Yugoslav situation, were not fully considered. 
President Izetbegovic went to Germany to discuss his fears 
for the survival of Bosnia, so the Germans could not plead 
ignorance of the dangers to Bosnia. They simply didn't want to 
see them or believe them, and probably its other goals previously 
discussed were more important to them than Bosnia's survival. 
The problem was that Bosnia had a substantial Serb minority, 
which was opposed to independence and thus the feeling was that 
either Bosnia would stay in a Serbian dominated Yugoslavia or it 
could secede and face war from its minority.7s 
And in the end, the Bosnians chose the latter, and the war 





















Rape used as a weapon, concentration camps set up, mass graves 
again marred European soil. No government wanted to understand 
any of this because it is much easier to ignore difficult things, 
especially when they cry out for action that one wants to avoid 
taking. Wanting to know is very important, as is perception in 
such complicated conflicts. It wasn't until so many television 
stations began broadcasting footage of the suffering that 
Americans did anything to help the Bosnian people. President 
Clinton favored a policy of lifting the arms embargo and 
launching air strikes on Bosnian Serb positions that he seemed to 
forget to discuss with the allies before trying to pitch it to 
them. He also didn't seem to realize he needed to pitch it 
enthusiastically to get their support. He then returned to the 
American people and told them that we wanted to do something, but 
now the allies won't let us. If he'd really wanted to do it, 
surely he knew the proper way to get it done. Author Patrick 
Glynn suggests that again, the U.S. knew a lot more about the 
situation in Bosnia than they appeared to. He says that 
officials toned down statements because they didn't really want 
to get involved in the conflict. 79 
It was easy for U.S. officials to feign ignorance of the 
troubles because there was a lot of misinformation floating 
about. Glynn cites intelligence reports that predicted the 
possible violent collapse of the country as early as 1990. He 
quotes George Kenney, the acting head of the Yugoslav section of 




















"'We knew perfectly well what was going on over there.' "so This 
may all be true, but if people don't want to know something, they 
can be very persistent in not facing the evidence. It is more 
convenient to think of the Balkans as a land of ancient hatreds 
and hopeless, endless violence, even if one should understand 
events as contemporary political maneuvering. If facts don't 
match one's impressions, one's perceptions, one can always decide 
the facts are wrong. This is what top level U.S. officials did, 
to a great extent. 
The issues of not wanting to know were just as involved in 
how the U.S. dealt with the 1994 crisis in Rwanda. Foreign 
involvement in Rwanda has been significant ever since the Germans 
journeyed to Africa; to explore reaction to the most recent 
crisis we must step back first. The first president of 
independent Rwanda was Gregoire Kayabanda. His grip on power did 
not last very long however, as General Juvenal Habyarimana, then 
Defense Minister, seized power in 1973. Writer Frank Smyth says 
that Habyarimana "promised to be fair to both Hutu and Tutsi; 
instead he distributed most of the resources and key positions to 
family, friends and associates from the region of his birthplace 
in northwestern Rwanda." He continued with the tradition of one-
party rule, and he did not allow Hutus who did not agree with 
him, or any Tutsis, to serve in his government. 81 There were 
many forms of external influences in Rwanda. Besides his 
internal systems of control and support, Habyarimana also enjoyed 





















ties with French President Mitterand and his family.82 A 
profitable arms trade existed between Rwanda and both France and 
Belgium, as well as with South Africa and some Middle Eastern 
states. 83 Both France and Belgium were strong supporters of 
Habyarimana's regime. France and Belgium's influence in Rwandan 
affairs, especially that of France, is a good study of how people 
are affected by forces outside of their domestic government. 
The thousands of Tutsi refugees who fled Rwanda in 1959 and 
1960 could be considered another external factor. Refugees did 
not play such a role in Bosnia, but as I have said, Yugoslav 
emigres and others who supported one nationalist cause or another 
could be found in the U.S. and elsewhere, as in Germany (the 
Croatian population there was a huge supporter for early 
recognition). Known as Banyarwanda, these Rwandans ended up 
scattered throughout Tanzania, Burundi, Zaire, but concentrated 
in Uganda, and would become the "largest and longest-standing 
unresolved refugee problem in Africa" by 1990. 84 This problem 
was something no one in the international community was really 
monitoring. Upon seeing the "Hutu Power" (the name for the 
Rwandan state ideology and power junta) forces take over their 
country, the Tutsi refugees' feelings of exclusion were 
reinforced--it seemed impossible to go home. Many Tutsi men 
joined the Ugandan army and fought against Idi Amin and his 
regime's human rights violations. Thus the Tutsis naturally 
gained favor with the Ugandans. When the children of these 






















The exiles were waiting for the civil and political rights 
situation to improve, but according to Gourevitch, Habyarimana 
insisted repeatedly that there wasn't any more room in Rwanda 
anyway since ninety-five percent of the land was already tied up 
in farming. In 1986 Habyarimana announced with an air of 
finality that the debate was pointless because the country was 
just too crowded, and no amount of negotiat,ion was going to 
change that. The next year, a group called the Rwandan Patriotic 
Front (RPF) was formed, mainly from the pool of Tutsi officers in 
the Ugandan army. By 1990 their aim was to overthrow the Hutu 
Power governing system, and so they ended up launching a military 
invasion against their home country; in this way the first of the 
expelled Tutsis came home. This began a complicated war. Was it 
a civil war, or an external invasion? The Ugandans obviously 
gave some supplies, but not direct military aid. The Tutsis 
invading considered themselves Rwandan. The reasons they fled in 
the first place were the fault of the colonial government--the 
artificial divisions and power structure that the Belgians had 
set up sparked the violence of the 1960s and the outflow of 
refugees. 86 
Among purely internal issues were the problems Habyarimana's 
government faced in the late 1980s. Rwandan citizens began 
calling for a pluralistic political system. Various Hutu 
opposition parties and groups that had formed began clamoring to 



















economic crisis, and for a country that is among the poorest in 
Africa and whose population has one of the world's highest 
percentages of HIV-positive people, these new crises bordered on 
disaster. B7 Habyarimana seemed fated to open the doors of his 
tight political house. However, it was also at this point that 
the RPF, the Tutsi-dominated force of refugees from Uganda, 
decided it was time to take back its share of its country: the 
RPF invaded Rwanda on October 1, 1990. The invasion was to be a 
temporary salvation for Habyarimana; there is nothing like a 
common enemy to unite opposing groups. Suddenly all Tutsis were 
under suspicion of supporting the invasion, and even the few 
rights they had been accorded before were now taken from them. Be 
Arbitrary detainment, executions, beatings, and rapes were 
methods used by both the guerrillas and the Rwandan government, 
though more so by government forces. B9 
France also sent troops to show its solidarity with the 
Habyarimana regime and oppose the RPF invasion. At least 300 
troops were sent in 1990, and there is some disagreement over 
whether they actually fought with the Rwandan army or just 
observed and advised. 90 David Rieff writes that they intervened 
again in 1992 after peace talks broke down and it looked like 
tithe political settlement in Rwanda would be achieved by 
massacre. 11 91 France upped its troop numbers to 680 in 1993 to 
contain a new offensive by the RPF. 92 In light of all of these 
actions, one Belgian official wished that France would "'take a 



















as other officials remarked, French efforts as they stood "were 
undermining collective diplomatic efforts to influence the 
regime. ,,93 
37 
Frank Smyth, author of a Human Rights Watch report on arms 
deals and human rights abuses in Rwanda, says that "the militias 
organized mobs of agitated Hutu that went to villages and fields 
in search of Tutsi," killing in total about 2000 people. 
According to Smyth, the government of Rwanda also had at least 
8,000 Tutsi arrested with little if any pretense of evidence. 
The RPF was ruthless as well, and Smyth states that in the course 
of the war they executed some military prisoners and hundreds of 
Hutu citizens they believed to be supporters of Habyarimana; 
perhaps thousands were "forcibly dislocated," and soldiers took 
some civilians to use as servants. 94 
After peace terms were negotiated in late 1992, there was a 
renewal of hostilities in February 1993, and then agreements were 
finally signed in Arusha, Tanzania that ended the war. 9S An 
international commission came to Rwanda in 1993 to investigate 
human rights violations during the war and documented such abuses 
as those described above. "The •.. commission was created, 
funded, and fully sponsored by international nongovernmental 
organizations," and because it was an international effort, "its 
report gained a high level of credibility. ,,96 The commission is 
important because its report was available to all states in late 
1993, and those like France and the United States who would say 



















1993 could only do so by knowingly ignoring the facts. 
The report did help alter some policies, however, showing 
that international action can have a positive impact. France 
ended up complying with a cease-fire that asked for the removal 
of French troops.91 Belgium, already repentant about its support 
of either side in the conflict, recalled its Ambassador for 
consultation after the report's release. Clearly, Belgium was 
concerned about not making the Rwanda situation worse, unlike 
most other countries who were still profiting from arms sales. A 
Belgian official called a meeting with the commission's co-chair, 
in order to ask for advice, saying, "'We accept your report. 
What should we do? I ,,98 
The policies of Belgium and France played other important 
and contrasting roles in the unfolding of the civil war that need 
to be explored in detail to illustrate some complex issues of 
international roles in one country's conflicts. Belgium tended 
to be responsive to the human rights violations it saw, whereas 
France generally exacerbated problems. Belgium and France had 
both been strong supporters and influences for Rwanda since its 
independence in 1962, but as Belgian influence decreased over the 
1980's after traditionally being Rwanda's closest ally and trade 
partner, France began to pick up the slack. 99 When the RPF 
invaded Rwanda, Belgium stopped all arms sales and "lethal aid" 
because of its unusual policy of not selling arms to any 
belligerent nation at war. France, however, did not let morality 

















Rwandan government even as it committed human rights violations 
against the rebels and its own ci tizens. 100 
39 
Not only did France sell arms to Rwanda, it also helped 
facilitate Rwanda's purchases of arms from other countries. In 
1992, Credit Lyonnais, a nationalized French bank, guaranteed a 
six million dollar weapons and equipment purchase by Rwanda of 
Egyptian merchandise in a "secret military assistance credit" 
that "has since become a subsidy." The Rwandan government was 
supposed to pay the Egyptians one million dollars up front, one 
million after a large tea crop was harvested, and the other four 
million dollars over the next four years. Credit Lyonnais would 
be responsible, as the guarantor, for any unpaid portions. Smyth 
writes that most private banks would never commit to such a risky 
backing. And by 1994, it appeared to have backfired for France--
when the civil war in Rwanda re-escalated in February 1993, the 
economy took a turn for the worse, and the tea field mentioned in 
the repayment plan was taken over by the Tutsi rebels, leaving 
Ii ttle left to pay Egypt and only gratitude to give France. 101 
Why did France feel such a strong connection with 
Habyarimana? As I have mentioned, a personal relationship had 
grown up between the French President and the Rwandan President, 
probably itself stemming from France's economic interests in 
Rwanda with its arms trade, and the countries remained close 
through the changes in French leadership. France also wanted to 
"maintain its credibility in French-speaking Africa. ,,102 The 




















whereas in Rwanda both French and the native Kinyarwanda are 
official languages103 All of these interests may have been 
products of (or secondary to) strategic interests, however, as 
one author points out that France believed "preserving a French-
speaking zone in Africa ... would, along with a nuclear arsenal, 
secure France's status as a major power and also secure its 
permanent seat on the Security Council. ,,104 Again, one can see 
that most nations go after their own interests first, ignoring 
any unpleasant facts about brutality or atrocities, and others 
pay with their lives . 
Is France complicit in the regime's abuses of human rights 
because it sold the arms used in the acts? A French colonel in 
Rwanda responded to some of Frank Smyth's questions about French 
military aid and activity in Rwanda by saying, "Are you saying 
that the providing of military assistance is a human rights 
violation? ,,105 This question is provocative. Since Rwanda has a 
history of having authoritarian, one-party, one-"ethnic" group 
governments, either imposed by foreign powers or, if a home-grown 
regime, enjoying the fairly unconditional endorsement of the same 
foreign powers (along with a few others), many in the population 
of Rwanda have often had their lives shaped by the will or 
influence of others. France is simply playing a variation on 
those themes of Rwandan history, and like a colonialist or 
dictator or other past offender, it must accept some blame. 
To fault a state for supporting a regime violating human 



















that a regime was doing so and the supportive state knew about 
it. Did France and the rest of the international community have 
such knowledge during the 1990-1993 civil war about the Rwandan 
government? Should they have seen these and later signs as 
warnings of the genocide to come? Evidence indicates they should 
have. 
In 1992, as the civil war raged on, a close friend of 
Habyarimana made a speech that became instantly infamous. Leon 
Mugesera, vice president of a city chapter of Habyarimana's 
National Revolutionary Movement for Development party (MRND is 
the French acronym), basically said that Tutsis are evil and 
should be purged from the great country of Rwanda. Author David 
Rieff cites the following remarks from the speech: 
The fatal mistake we made in 1959 was to let them [the 
Tutsis] get out ... They belong in Ethiopia and we are going to 
find a shortcut to get there by throwing them into the 
Nyabarongo river .... We have to act. Wipe them all out!106 
Philip Gourevitch quotes Mugesera further, "We the people are 
obliged to take responsibility ourselves and wipe out this 
scum. ,,101 
The government-run radio was equally inflammatory; it 
broadcast news-like warnings of Tutsis coming to kill all Hutus. 
Radio des Milles Collines, "owned by members of Habyarimana's 
inner circle," seems to have been the main offender, although 
Radio Rwanda is also mentioned as another source of hate 
propaganda. 108 Other forms of media inci ted hatred as well; the 




















after the RPF attack in 1990. Number Eight was "The Hutus should 
stop having mercy on the Tutsis. ,,109 Number Ten was "' We shall 
consider a traitor any Hutu who will persecute his Hutu brother 
for having read, spread, and taught this ideology,'" which 
effectively condemned all moderate Hutus. 110 Clearly, France must 
have known the kind of regime it was sending its troops to aid 
and for which it was subsidizing arms sales. United States 
offiCials, despite the violent human rights abuses during the 
civil war discussed earlier and these propaganda machinations, 
still could be found saying in a 1992 report to Congress that 
"'there is no evidence of any systematic human rights abuses by 
the military or any other element of the government of 
Rwanda. ,,,111 It is probable that the U.S., France, and others 
ignored these signs because they did not wish to see them. For 
France, they might have interfered with its economic and 
political relationship with Rwanda and its leaders. For the 
U.S., accepting the reality of problems fomenting in Rwanda could 
have meant accepting the need to intervene, or send more aid and 
development money_ 
All of this hate-inspiring speech and propaganda was going 
on in the context of a civil war, and Habyarimana's fear of 
losing power to either the Tutsis or to other Hutus. Rwanda's 
recent history might have been very different had this hate 
campaign ended when hostilities did. However, after a peace 
treaty was signed in 1993, tensions in Rwanda were still running 


















stop. Radio des Milles Collines broadcast statements 
"terrorizing the Hutu with warnings about the evil Tutsi-led RPF 
and Hutu oppositionists, who were labeled 'enemies' or 'traitors' 
and who 'deserved to die. ,,,112 Rieff writes that the radio 
stations "had called upon the militants to kill everyone, even 
the children," and that Radio des Milles Collines reminded the 
Hutu that "'the grave is only half full'" of Tutsis, as half fled 
after the Hutu uprising in 1959, and asked "'Who will help us 
fi 11 it?' ,,113 
According to several scholars, there is plenty of evidence 
that Habyarimana and the coterie of individuals keeping him in 
power had been planning for years a systematic campaign to get 
rid of all Tutsis. 114 A regime enjoying the full support of many 
foreign governments, and the special friendship of France, was 
planning genocide right under their noses. Although this 
information is recent, there were yet more signs at the time, in 
early 1994, that warned of the summer's violence to come that the 
international community overlooked or ignored. Canadian General 
Romio Dallaire commanded the 2,500 troops that were the United 
Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), and he received 
distressing information through a Rwandan informant about Hutu 
plans to kill Tutsis. Dallaire sent a cable in January 1994 in 
which he said that the Hutu informant had orders to "'register 
all Tutsis in Kigali. He suspects it is for their extermination. 
Example he gave was that in twenty minutes his personnel could 










of the massacres that were to come, a suggestion of mass murder. 
The Hutu informant was a military official who worked in Hutu 
military training camps; but the camps were not shut down nor 
their arms confiscated, and the U.N. would not even agree to 
protect the informant. Belgian officials unquestionably knew 
about all of this, but did nothing; the U.N. decided not to bring 
the informant's information before the Security Council. It was 
to become one more missed opportunity to prevent or lessen the 
tragedy to come in April 1994. 116 It has not been explained why 
nothing was done; the note seems like a clear warning. Perhaps 
it was discounted, or perhaps the source was unreliable. Or 
perhaps the matter was simply not perceived as important enough 
to be concerned with . 
The catalyst for putting this plan, which Habyarimana had 
surely helped design, into action was his death. On April 6, 
President Habyarimana was flying back from Tanzania after meeting 
with the President of Burundi and others to discuss his 
compliance with the Arusha peace accords. The plane was shot 
down, apparently by surface-to-air missiles, upon its approach to 
the Kigali airport, and all on board were killed. The speed with 
which Habyarimana's Presidential Guard and the Rwandan Army 
reacted after the tragedy is more evidence that plans had been 
formulated for just such an event. The missiles came from the 
area around Kigali airport; one writer states they came from the 
Kanombe army base next to the airport. 117 Soldiers from the 
















attempt at investigation, which suggests that they had something 
to hide. Thus it could be that Hutu Power extremists shot down 
the plane because they were angry at Habyarimana's softening on 
power-sharing and agreeing to implement other aspects of the 
peace accords. However, the incident remains a mystery. The 
immediate response of Hutu leaders was that the RPF had done it, 
and that remained their assertion. 118 
The massacres of moderate Hutus and any Tutsis that could be 
found began that night. Again, the coordination of effort and 
speedy mobilization of forces suggest that this was not a 
spontaneous reaction, but an execution of orders. All Rwanda's 
previous human rights abuses pale in comparison, as the greater 
tragedy they were hinting at finally unfolded in the deaths of 
somewhere between 500,000 to 1 million people over three 
months. 119 The Hutu Presidential Guard mobilized village militias 
and the formally trained Interhamwe (those who attack together) 
and Impuzamugambi (those who have the same goal) militia groups; 
all of these then proceeded to track down Hutu opposition 
leaders, and to indiscriminate slaughter Tutsis by the 
hundreds. no Murders were committed with guns, machetes, even 
artillery rounds were fired at times. Ten Belgian peacekeepers 
were killed the first day while trying to protect the Hutu Prime 
Minister of Habyarimana's government Agathe Uwilingiyimana; she 
had come into office under a new rule that the prime minister 
should be from another party, and thus she was singled out for 













(the U.N. had acknowledged it as such by July of 1994) was only 
stopped because RPF forces were able to defeat the Rwandan Army 
and the bands of militias in a military campaign. l22 
46 
Besides the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda, how did the international community cope with the 
unthinkable reality of the human rights disaster in Rwanda? At 
first it simply didn't think about it, and thus didn't have to 
try to cope. Then it seemed to cope in entirely the wrong ways . 
A few examples illustrate the tragic flaws and bitter, costly 
irony of the international response. 
The United Nations delayed in labeling the tragedy genocide 
for more than a month after the killings began, which many 
believe was to avoid the obligations of intervention that the 
United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide entails. The United States issued statements 
cautioning against official use of the term in public 
statements. l23 General Dallaire, the commander of UNAMIR, said on 
April 21 that he could halt the slaughter if he had five to eight 
thousand troops, but nothing was done. 124 By May the U.N. 
Secretariat was trying to mobilize support for more troops, but 
no member states would volunteer the needed men and materials. l25 
France, with characteristic passion, launched Operation 
Turquoise in June ostensibly to set up a safe zone to protect 
civilians and allow humanitarian assistance access. Some have 
written that its real purpose was to prop up the Rwandan Army and 














Gourevitch writes that Interhamwe groups celebrated the troops' 
presence with a sign that said "'Welcome French Hutus. ,,,127 The 
safe zone that the French set up did accept "militia members, ... 
propagandists from the ex-government, and ... Radio des Milles 
Collines' spewing out its anti-RPF messages." However, it is 
hard to blame the French for not providing an ideal political and 
human rights situation in the conditions of disorder that 
characterized Rwanda at the time; one author writes that probably 
several thousand Tutsis were saved because of their presence, and 
that means a great deal--if they continue to survive the turmoil 
in their country. 128 One can, however, blame the French for 
continuing to sell arms to the Hutus while the killings went on, 
as the Arms Proj ect of Human Rights Watch reported. 129 
What are some of the underlying reasons for these responses 
--or lack thereof, to be more accurate. Rwanda was not a vital 
security interest to any Western country except France, hence the 
high degree of French involvement. And the U.S. was not 
interested in Rwanda, because, like Bosnia, whatever happened 
there would not directly affect us. There were no Rwandan 
immigrants lobbying Congress, no interest groups giving money, 
and Rwanda's warfare was often labeled "tribal." There does seem 
to be some racism involved. Americans sometimes think very 
little of African governments in general, and one country 
descending into random violence does not surprise us. There were 
similar things said about Bosnia, but less so. In both countries 


















favor of simple ancient ethnic hatreds and ignorant stereotyping. 
A cycle of violence was begun in Rwanda with colonial 
repression, and it continued as one group of Rwandans would 
periodically attack the other, and when the smaller violations of 
human rights were continually ignored, they built up over the 
years a situation that was exploited by the genocidal organizers 
of the Habyarimana regime. The early inconsistencies of Belgian 
policy, the almost uniformly harmful policies of the French, and 
the general indifference or ignorance of the rest of the world 
helped keep an authoritarian government in power in Rwanda. 
World leaders also managed to let themselves miss all the danger 
signals that flashed ever-brighter as the conflicts within 
Rwandan society grew ever more unsolvable. Rwanda and Bosnia 
both exhibit many unusual and tragic human rights issues that 
have their roots in the complicated political and social history 
of each; their tragedy is that few international actors wanted to 
deal with complexity--they preferred to wait until the "simple" 
horrors of mass murder would finally force them to act. 
Post-World War II Estonia was actually more like occupied 
Rwanda than Titoist Yugoslavia. Estonia was under communist rule 
for 45 years. Its people were subject to deportations, 
imprisonments, and executions; it was treated much as a colony . 
It was a conquered territory, a conquered people. The communist 
party was of course in complete control of electoral processes. 
At first the majority of members were Russians, or Russian 















Estonians only made up 17 percent of the Estonian Communist Party 
(CPE) . 130 Russian was establ ished as the national language. 131 
By 1954 the purges eased and Estonians began to feel at least a 
sense of stability. In 1960 there began a "resurgence of 
Estonian culture," which started with literary arts. But still, 
in freedom of expression, living standards, and economic growth, 
in nearly every facet of measurement, Estonia lagged far behind 
the Western European countries, though in many ways ahead of the 
rest of the Soviet Union. 132 By 1980, Estonians dissenters had 
begun to make waves. After one prominent activist died in 
prison, pictures of his grave marked only by a numbered stake 
made the international press and stirred up much support. The 
fledgling movement which had spawned him was crushed in 1982, but 
remained an underground force. 133 
In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became head of the Soviet Union, 
and the crackdown eased considerably. In 1987, many dissidents 
were released from prison; opposition was becoming acceptable. 
In 1986 and 1987 the first major protests were about 
environmental issues, including media reports on workers sent to 
clean up Chernobyl under dangerous conditions. Estonians then 
began to demand economic autonomy from Moscow. In 1988, the 
"singing revolution" began; Estonians gathered in June for an 
established festival, but people stayed up all night singing and 
waving the flags of independent Estonia. This is a different 
kind of protest than one saw in the former Yugoslavia or Rwanda. 
















group, and the thought of singing against one's opponents, 
instead of vilifying them or fearing them, was conceivable .134 
50 
Western leaders were cautious in their support of Estonia 
and the other Baltic states' bids for independence from the 
Soviet Union. But Estonia was recognized on 2 September 1991. 135 
Though Estonian citizenship laws have been criticized by some 
human rights groups, they have not kept Estonia from joining the 
Council of Europe or gaining associate membership to the European 
Union. 136 The international communi ty was watching more carefully 
as Estonia made the transition to an independent nation. Because 
of Russia nearby, Estonia's relationship with its minority 
Russians is important for stability. Hanne-Margret Birckenbach 
has written a paper on ways the international community acted to 
foster non-violence in Estonia. Estonian leaders very much 
wanted to be a part of Europe; they got in the Council of Europe 
in 1993, they wanted to join the European Union, eventually NATO 
as well. 137 For the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, there were few 
countries with a real interest in them--they are not so close to 
a large country with nuclear weapons, and economically they were 
not a large asset to any world power. And so Estonia was watched 
more carefully, and it worked. 
But Bosnia is still not healed, and neither is Rwanda. The 
international community has placed an arms embargo on Yugoslavia 
for its actions in Kosovo. That kind of measure didn't work 
before and won't now. As if the record of the international 


















to repeat the same patterns of behavior in Kosovo. As one has 
seen, high level officials can talk about doing the right thing 
while selling arms to genocidaires, and they can avoid talking at 
all, but they cannot be persuaded to act unless absolutely forced 
to. Like Bosnia, there is sporadic violence in Kosovo, not 
between armies, but armed groups. And like Bosnia, it is 
difficult to get accurate information, there is a propaganda war 
raging, and reciprocal violence is the norm. On the internet one 
can find pages defending the Bosnian Serbs, the Bosnian Muslims, 
the Kosovo Serbs, and the Kosovo movement for independence. All 
are perfectly contradictory, of course. Hutu genocidaires in 
Rwanda walk up to judges on their hearing dates and plead not 
guilty, because they feel they were trying to help their country . 
It is not the job, nor is it possible even if one considers it 
the job, of the international community to erase hatred, self-
righteousness, and bloodthirstiness. It is, however, the job of 
the international community, of leaders like Clinton, Chirac, 
Annan, and Yeltsin to make some kind of effort to stop the worst 
effects of these characteristics when they appear so blatantly on 
the world stage. Estonia may have been helped to avoid ethnic 
violence because of the more prominent role of external actors in 
monitoring its situation, the more inclusive attitude of those 
actors, and the more positive perceptions that they had of 
Estonia. In the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, however, other 
countries either tried to stay away, or (as at times in the case 















countries wanted to see what was going on--that might mean 
politically risky action could be required--so they simply 
ignored any indication of the truth until it was much too late. 
Perceptions and priorities became self-fulfilling prophecies as 
warning signs went unheeded and human suffering remained second 
place to political expediency. The world may have become more 
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